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ABSTRACT 
Traditional detection tools for malware (maiicious software) such as antivirus 
scanners have not been effective in the long term, as new unknown mal ware or 
variants of existing ones keep emerging. Current malware detection techniques have 
failed to provide a comprehensive real-time solution due to their limitations or trade-
offs in system performance. Hence, to address these limitations and trade-offs, this 
research work aims at improving malware detection by adopting context-dependent 
agent coordination. This paper proposes autonomic context-dependent architecture 
that provides the framework for building efficient automated intrusion detection 
systems capable of performing real-time analysis intelligently and adaptively. Such a 
system would adopt autonomic ways of using context-dependency for the intrusion 
inference of even multiple blended threats so that an appropriate action could be 
undertaken efficiently in e-businesses. 
Keyword: Malware, Obfuscated Attack, Intrusion Detection, Autonomic Agent, 
Context-dependency 
1. Introduction 
Information security experts, researchers and e-businesses face a stumble block when 
they encounter a new blended / hybrid (obfuscated) malware attack (Christodorescu, 
et ai., 2005; Egele, et ai., 2007; Padilla, 2007; Gu, et ai., 2008). Recent malware 
attacks have successfully evaded the current security mechanisms stealthily with huge 
payouts (Saleh, et al., 2007; Zang and Tadi, 2007). Future tactics are to target master 
boot records with viruses that hook rootkits so that infections get activated at the time 
of booting the computer even before the operating system gets loaded (Wilhelm and 
Tzi-cker, 2007; Yin, et al., 2008). Research studies indicate that commercial malware 
detectors cannot cope with such obfuscated attacks (Josse, 2007; Beegle, 2007). This 
situation warrants a comprehensive study of malware trends so as to fight this cyber 
warfare efficiently (McAfee, 2006; Sophos, 2008). 
A number of solutions have emerged, ranging from quick-fix tools to more broad-
range counter measures, including intrusion detection systems (IDS) for many attacks 
caused by malware such as Blaster, Mydoom, Mywife, and Sasser worms. Some use 
static analysis techniques such as binary inspection using control flow graph methods 
or buffer overflow inspection (Christodorescu, et ai., 2005; Allamigeon and Hymans, 
2008). Specific behaviour-based detectors are also proposed, such as methods to 
detect nodes in a network that are suspicious so as to combat spreading of mal ware, 
especially through email attachments(Xiong.2004;Wehner.2007.Gu. et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, a persistent monitoring tool of the networks and computer systems 
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could lead to performance trade-offs in the quality of Internet service. Specific 
platform-based detectors are also being developed, such as hardware checks to 
determine if a particular operating system kernel is maliciously modified and other 
techniques that make use of the knowledge of interrupt address table or system 
vectors (Linn, et al., 2005; Wang and Dasgupta, 2007). However, there is no single 
methodology that does a comprehensive analysis of malware and more importantly 
designed towards detecting multiple instances of mal ware. 
In general, the current practice shows that most of the detection mechanisms are 
designed for specific malware, based on the type of intrusion method adopted. There 
is so much of manual introspection and analysis required especially while dealing 
with blended symptoms. In addition, the current techniques are not capable of 
performing runtime analysis on multiple instances of malware simultaneously based 
on the context (Beegle, 2007; Sophos, 2008). In such a situation, autonomic 
computing, which is capable of self-configuring, self-managing and self-adapting 
proactively based on the contexts could be adopted (Tennenhouse, 2001; Kephart and 
Chess, 2003). Hence, this paper proposes autonomic malware detection architecture 
that uses context-dependent agents that are host-based as weII as network-based for 
detecting malicious activities pre-emptively. Such architecture provides the 
framework for performing runtime analysis intelligently and adaptively depending on 
the contexts of the possible intrusions in a fuIIy-automated and coordinated manner. 
The paper reports on the possible development of a malware detection tool that could 
adopt the proposed architecture for e-businesses. 
In view of the paucity of research in conducting a comprehensive study of current 
malware situation, this paper attempts to fiII this gap and is organised as foIIows: 
Section 2 describes the existing malware detection approaches and classifies them 
under three main categories, namely, syntactic, semantic and polymorphic pattern 
detection. Section 3 analyses the recent malware evolution and trends. With the 
underlying knowledge of mal ware detection patterns and an analysis of their evolution 
/ trends, Section 4 proposes autonomic context-dependent architecture for malware 
detection. Section 5 provides the guidelines for implementation and identifies the 
major challenges in this development process. Finally, Section 6 presents the 
conclusions of this ongoing research work and the plan for future work. 
2. Malware Pattern Detection 
Malware detection techniques are based on the patterns exhibited by the malicious 
code. In general, the intrusion and threat methods adopted by mal ware could be 
broadly classified as: Static, Dynamic and Hybrid. While static approaches use code 
syntax manipulations, dynamic approaches use process manipulations. In some cases, 
both code manipulation as well as process maliciousness could be combined leading 
to hybrid methods. The various forms of malware implementations are stated below: 
• InstaIIation or Software bundling (Static) - Malicious code are plugged into host 
software or bundled in additional components by taking advantage of an 
installation exploit. The malicious code runs every time the software / 
component is used and it gets installed into a system and modifies that system . 
• Self-Replication (Static) - Mal ware gets onto new targets that are associated 
with an existing one. 
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• Scanning or Surveying (Dynamic) - Malware could be operating from remote, 
find ing new targets for its attack 
• Injection into process or data (Hybrid) - The maliciousness gets injected into 
other running processes or data so as to gain additional privileges. 
• Concealment (Hybrid) - This method is used to hide the presence of certain 
processes, files or system resources or to prevent the disabling of software, 
processes or security settings. 
• Payload (Hybrid) - This method is used to download or to send content 
(personal data, processes and behaviour patterns) from or to third parties. 
Investigating a compromise requires the understanding of the above forms of mal ware 
implementations. Rootkits, log files, password / hidden files and processes are some 
of the avenues through which compromises could be analysed. Such analysis has 
resulted in the design of malware detection tools that are primarily based on the 
patterns exhibited by malware. Hence, understanding the present techniques that are 
primarily based on malware pattern detection plays a major role in arriving at an 
effective information security strategy for the future. 
2.1 Present Techniques in Malware Detection 
A survey of malware detection techniques reported in literature indicates that they 
could be classified as syntax-based (structural properties of code) or semantic-based 
(malicious code's behaviour) (Christodorescu, et al., 2005; Bayer, et al., 2006). 
However, recent trends indicate that hackers use multiple techniques to obfuscate 
code and behaviour (Udupa, et al., 2005; Christodorescu, et al., 2007; Allamigeon and 
Hymans, 2008). Such polymorphic approaches could make use of a combination of 
techniques with dynamic encryption keys for their transformations so that they could 
easily evade the present mal ware detectors. This section classifies the present 
malware detection approaches under three categories: Syntactic, Semantic and 
Polymorphic pattern detection (Figure 1). 
Syntactic Pattern 
Detection 
Semantic Pattern 
Detection 
-Trash Insertion 
-Code Randomisation 
-System Call Frequencies 
-TCP/IP Sessions 
-Instruction Equivalence 
-Binary Obfuscation ... 
-Payload Mechanisms 
~ing 
Polymorphic Pattern Detection 
-Stack Buffer Overflows 
-Heap Buffer Overflows 
-Privileged I/O 
-Kernel-mode Attacks 
Figure 1. Classification of Malware Detection Approaches 
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To obfuscate the maliciousness, several syntax-based transformations such as dead-
code insertion (trash insertion), code transposition (code randomisation), code 
replacement (instruction equivalence) and register reallocation (binary obfuscation) 
are adopted. These transformations change the signatures and behaviour of mal ware 
effectively and hence are difficult to be captured by commonly used antivirus 
scanners. This has resulted in much research being carried out to study such syntactic 
patterns of obfuscations. An example of a "no operation" (hexadecimal 90 or nop) 
insertion to obfuscate Chernobyl/CIH virus is given in Figures 2a and 2b. Apart from 
such dead-code (nop) insertion, data modification could be achieved through code 
transposition and register or instruction reassignment is done using pointer aliasing or 
control flow modifications. However, recent obfuscated versions of such virus use a 
combination of these modifications, making signature-based detections quite difficult. 
For example, the Chernobyl/CIH virus though originally discovered in 1998, its 
obfuscated version was detected in later years (Christodorescu and lha, 2003) and the 
recent one was discovered in 2007. 
E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050 
OFOI 4C24 FE5B 83C3 lCFA 8B2B 
Figure 2a. Hexadecimal Code Pattern of Chernobyl/CIH Virus 
(Source: Wang, 1998) 
E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4290 5150 5090 
OFOI 4C24 FE5B 83C3 lC90 FA8B 2B 
Figure 2b. Obfuscated Code ofChernobyl/CIH Virus 
Traditionally, there are three kinds of analysis of executables carried out that look for 
such tell-tale signs, namely through program slicing, pointer and data address 
overflows and system call analysis (Lo, et al., 1995). Some researchers (Bergeron, et 
aI., 2001; Giffin, et al., 2002) analyse the executable code for any malicious intent by 
disassembling the code statically in order to identify the above mentioned syntactic 
obfuscation patterns. This way, certain malicious code concealed or bundled in 
software and those injected into process I data could be identified. In addition, some 
areas of vulnerability that initialise hardware before the operating system gets loaded 
could be detected using boot firmware inspection (Adelstein, et al., 2002). Some 
systems do not have checks on the size of device registers and this could result in 
overwriting of heap buffers at runtime. Such a system is vulnerable to an attack that 
could control data overflowing a heap buffer by bypassing register checks. An 
attacker could potentially compromise the machine and execute arbitrary code gaining 
unauthorised privileges. 
More recently, researchers mathematically model syntactic patterns of programs. 
Sung, et al. (2004) propose Euclidean distance modelling to calculate deviations of a 
sequence of APls from known signatures. Other static analysis that model using the 
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theory of non-deterministic finite state automata (Halfond and Orso, 2005) to detect 
SQL-injection attacks in web applications are also applied dynamically during 
runtime. Such research indicates that different modelling techniques emerge to 
effectively analyse the syntactic patterns of malware, based on the context. 
Semantic Pattern Detection 
In creating new malware, attempts have been quite successful in adding new 
behaviour without changing the essence of the code that could evade from syntax-
based detectors. In order to identify such new semantic patterns present in a system, 
some approaches use a training phase to determine the clean state or base profile of 
the system and subsequently undergo the inspection phase. The base profile or a 
snapshot of the clean system is determined using various parameters such as normal 
frequency of certain system calls made, bytes per packet received at the host computer 
or network payload, normal TCP/IP sessions, phishing, etc. Wang and Stolfo (2004) 
determine the expected payload for each service and use buffer overflow methods to 
detect a mal ware. Sekar, et at. (2002) analyse the statistical properties observed in 
network traffic to determine the maliciousness of the network events on a target 
network. Christodorescu, et at. (2005) represented mal ware signatures using templates 
to generalise the essence of the malicious code's behaviour. They capture malicious 
behaviour using a template as given in Figure 3 as an example. This malware decrypts 
(using function, f) the memory starting from address, const addrl and writes the 
decrypted data starting from address, const_ addr2. 
I A = const addrl 
! 
B = const addr2 
! 
condition(A)? 
! False 
mem[B] = f(mem[A]) 
! 
A=A+c 
! 
B=B+d 
I jump const addr2 
True 
Figure 3. Template of a Malicious Behaviour 
(Source: Christodorescu et at., 2005) 
In addition, some studies focus on mathematical techniques to capture the normal 
versus anomalous behaviour of systems. Wespi, et at. (2000) use varied length audit 
trail patterns as the detection method, Taylor and Alves-Foss (2001) compute a low 
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cost approach to detect anomalous traffic, Sekar, et al. (200 I) create a Finite State 
Automata (FSA) based approach to detect an anomaly in the system and Sato, et al. 
(2002) determine a process profile by ranked frequencies of system caIls. Some 
detection tools are specific to certain platforms / applications. For example, Masri and 
Podgurski (2005) use dynamic information flow analysis methodology that is 
designed specificaIly for Java applications. While such dynamic detection of 
anomalous semantic patterns are more common, some studies (Li, et al., 2005) prefer 
static detection techniques as the malware could be detected before it could be 
executed on the host system. However, static methods are limited in their capability as 
they look for semantic patterns in the training phase, such as understanding file 
formats that the system associates with. 
Polymorphic Pattern Detection 
While certain malware can be identified by syntax-based detectors, there are malware 
that can only be detected based on semantic pattern analysis (Zhang and Tadi, 2007). 
However, newer versions of malware have adopted combinations of syntax-based and 
semantic-based patterns that have been morphed and this leads to much research work 
that study malware with polymorphic patterns. Some of the ways of achieving this are 
by using stack buffer overflows, heap buffer overflows, privileged 110 of network 
mechanisms and format string attacks. Giffin, et al. (2002) propose a Control Graph 
technique derived from static analysis of the executables, foIlowed by remote agent 
checks of system caIls to protect the host machines. Similarly, Wang and Dasgupta 
(2007) scan for the malware in two ways, one being syntax-based (white-box 
approach) and the other being semantic-based (black-box approach). They adopt a 
method that compares the high-level and low-level results in both approaches and 
relate them to a clean host to determine maliciousness. On the other hand, Mori, et al. 
(2006) propose a tool that detects mobile self-encrypting and polymorphic viruses as 
these types of viruses do not exhibit the usual syntactic and semantic patterns which 
traditional pattern matching techniques rely on. While Suh, et al. (2004) use dynamic 
information flow technique to track privileged I/O of networking mechanisms, Kirda, 
et al. (2006) propose a client-side technique for preventing cross-site scripting attacks 
that try to exploit end-user's personal information. 
<SCRIPT language= J avaScript 
src='inc/ojldlb.js'></ 
SCRIPT> 
<SCRIPT language= J avaScript> 
uzysaq('http://doredirect.com/ 
index.php?kw=spyware&id=ll ') 
</SCRIPT> 
Figure 4. An Example of Links Hijacking 
(Source: Muttik, 2005) 
Malicious behaviour in Internet witnessed through techniques such as index / link 
hijacking, DNS poisoning (pharming) are in fact defacement attacks that have 
exploited the existing vulnerabilities that were created due to either poorly managed 
remote-root / security configurations or mistakes committed by the end-users. Figure 
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4 shows an example of links hijacking where one of the links 
·www.arc\ab.ru/stingertrojan-remova1.html· has the HTML with an obfuscated 
redirecting script that uses another level of obfuscation from an external OJLDLB.JS 
file. 
While adopting malware detection techniques, all the three pattern detections need to 
be catered to so that any type of malicious activity could be identified and isolated. 
Typically, a malicious activity could be observed at the Operating System (OS) level 
or at the application level. At both these levels, intrusions could be detected by 
analysing specification patterns (Syntactic Pattern Detection) 
analysing patterns in audit data (Semantic Pattern Detection), 
inspecting anomalies in processes, memory, system tables (Semantic and 
Polymorphic Pattern Detection). 
While most of the malicious activities originate from the internet / network, they 
could also be injected from the host computer. Hence, in business organisations, a 
comprehensive Intrusion Detection System (IDS) should be adopted that caters to 
both network-based inspections as well as host-based inspections. Similarly, public 
awareness of the threat and educating them with appropriate countermeasure strategy 
are important. However, recent malware trends indicate that the current antivirus 
tools and IDS are not sufficient to cope with the race. The subsequent section 
discusses the next wave of malware that have evolved to be difficult to detect and 
remediate. 
3. Recent Malware Trends 
Since the emergence of Morris worm in 1988, many Trojans employing stealth 
strategies have dominated the crimeware industry (Chen, 2003). A recent Swedish 
bank attack in early 2007 is only the beginning of malware warfare by the commonly 
known form of a powerful Trojan called Haxdoor (Saleh, et aI., 2007). As it possessed 
rootkit capabilities, it could hide its presence, processes and files on an infected 
system (AusCERT, 2006). Such a sophisticated malware could only be detected by 
antivirus programs that use kernel driver mode or other rootkit detection mechanisms 
(Josse, 2007). More recently, malware are created to possess spying capabilities so as 
to steal personal information (such as online bank account details including login and 
passwords) using toolkits such as keystroke loggers and form grabbers. They make 
use of rootkit hooking techniques that could have the ability to disable firewalls and 
could go undetected by the present antivirus software tools (Beegle, 2007; Todd, et al., 
2007). Figure 5 provides the evolution of a typical malware gaining sophisticated 
capabilities from one generation to the next. 
The first generation malware could typically open TCP ports such as 16661 and other 
additional ports and would wait for commands from a remote attacker to steal 
information. In addition, the second generation mal ware could hide itself by hooking 
the System Service Dispatch Table and would attempt to make a copy of the system 
password file. It could also log key strokes that match banking-site-related keywords 
and would send out an email to the remote attacker containing the information stolen 
from the compromised system. The third generation malware could run system 
commands such as %System%\w32tm.exe as a hidden process so that it would not be 
visible from Task Manager and would create a remote thread inside the Web browser 
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to steal cached credentials. The more sophisticated fourth generation malware could 
typically update registry keys in order to disable the kernel from checking for 
abnormal memory overwrites. Through such kernel-mode intrusions, it could 
terminate antivirus programs and firewalls and would subsequently take control of the 
system. 
First Generation Malware 
Opens TCP ports; Unauthorized access; Steals 
POP3/IMAP server name, user name and password 
~ 
Second Generation Malware 
Modifies Registry and hides activities; Steals domain, 
DNS settings; Modifies Web browser processes and 
settings; Sends user identity information to the hacker 
~ 
Third Generation Malware 
Runs In Safe Boot mode; Invisible from Task 
Manager; Steals ICQ passwords, RAS and payment 
information - uses Keyloggers and Form-Grabbers 
~ 
Fourth Generation Malware 
Operates in Kernel-mode; Overwrites parts of the 
memory; Hijacks the user system and gets by an IRC 
bot; Disables firewalls and creates a botnet 
Figure 5. Evolution of a Typical Malware as a Kernel Rootkit 
Thus, malware has evolved from having simple Application Programming Interface 
(API) hooking techniques to sophisticated rootkit hooking capabilities in order to 
intercept system calls and interrupts, thereby to compromise the kernel. It is able to 
evade from antivirus tools by binding more than one virus signature, compressing 
malicious code or by faking filenames. Through such code obfuscation and other 
polymorphism techniques, it is able to perform the following: 
hide the process from task manager, 
modifY pointers in process/ task list, 
modifY System Call Table 
modifY Interrupt Descriptor Table, 
control/ replace file handler routines and 
control memory system handling. 
As new variations of Malware keep emerging, new anti-malware tools are being 
developed as part of countermeasures. However, the recent trend is to have the master 
boot record (MBR) as the rootkit's launch point (F-Secure, 2008). The rootkit need 
not change registry or startup programs to attack, rather hooks to disk driver object. 
One such MBR rootkit discovered in 2008 is called Mebroot and is reported as the 
stealthiest malware detected so far. Figure 6 shows how the rootkit hooks to disk.sys 
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driver object and starts sending packets. Soon this would lead to multi-platform 
malware attacks targeting more than one platform (e.g. Windows and Linux kernels) 
during the boot process. 
f9ge2c30 
804£ 320e 
f9ge2c30 
B17eb410 
B17eb410 
80H 320e 
CLASSPNPI ClassCreateClose 
nt!IoplnvalidDeviceRequest 
CLASSPNP!ClassCreateClose 
~br_rootkit!DiskHook_MJ_READ~RlTE 
~br_rootkit!DiskHook_MJ_READVRlTE 
nt!IoplnvalidDeviceRequest 
Figure 6. MBR Rootkit Hooked to Disk Driver 
(Source: www.f-secure.com/weblogl) 
These developments in malware have resulted in the emergence of many effective 
tools for both static and dynamic analysis. Many organisaions use a collection of 
tools depending upon their requirements and preferences. For syntax-based malware 
pattern detection, commercial tools such as OllyDbg, IDA Pro, Hex-Rays, SABRE 
BinNavi and LordPE adopt reverse engineering techniques by using de-compression 
and de-compilation methods for binary code analysis. In the case of semantics-based 
malware pattern recognition, tools such as ProcMon, FileSpy, IceSword and Rootkit 
Unhooker are useful in monitoring system processes and files, some of them being 
helpful in malicious rootkit detection as well. There are also many Web-based and 
network-based monitoring tools being developed that are useful for organisations that 
manage many network devices and servers. Some of the commercially available 
tools are Anubis, CWSandbox, Snort, NetIQ, ArcSight, WireS hark and NetForensic 
that monitor networks for any kind of security alert. There are several tools to solely 
detect hooking behaviours (Yin, et at., 2008). Though each of these tools is designed 
to detect specific malicious activity, there is no single automated runtime analysis tool 
that could detect simultaneous mal ware instances of different forms occurring at 
multiple locations, especially those with new obfuscations. This is because such a 
situation requires self-adaptable architectures for the IDS to monitor in a highly 
dynamic distributed environment. Hence, in the next section, autonomic context-
dependent architecture is proposed for efficient IDS development. 
4. Autonomic Context-Dependent Intrusion Detection Architecture 
From the recent trends described in the previous section, it is evident that malware is 
evolving from user-level to kernel-level rootkits and future malware would have 
blended obfuscations resulting in highly powerful attacks from the lowest system 
level (Schmugar, 2007; Wilhelm and Tzi-cker, 2007). Hence, any approach to 
intrusion detection should proactively monitor and collect data from the target system 
for any suspicious activity. Currently, an intrusion detection system adopted in 
practice can be categorised under two main types, namely, network-based intrusion 
detection systems (NIDS) and host-based intrusion detection systems ClllDS) (Wang 
and Stolfo, 2004). While NIDS monitor network traffic and anomalies, the HIDS 
monitor the host system, mostly as a thin software layer between the hardware/ 
firmware and the OS layer so as to perform inspections and consistency checks of 
memory, processes and system tables. Both methods of intrusion detection are 
required as they complement each other. However, the current intrusion detection 
architecture is such that each of NIDS and HIDS operate independently and there is 
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no coordinated effort. There is still manual intervention required when there is a doubt 
of malicious activity. Since the rootkit-enabled malicious codes are obfuscated and 
attack very fast, an efficient intrusion detection methodology is warranted to predict 
and prevent any adversary move before the malware takes full control of the system. 
Host-
Based 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Agent 
(HIDA) ........ 
...•... 
"'" 
.... 
..•... 
.............. 
.......................... 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Sensors (IDS) 
Monitor I Analyse 
Autonomic 
Detection 
Manager (ADM) 
Policy Control 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Effectors (IDE) 
Plan I Execute 
............. 
. ..... .... 
.......... 
,'./,'/./.// ... 
.......... 
,.,"" 
Network-
Based 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Agent 
(NIDA) 
Figure 7. Autonomic Context-Dependent Intrusion Detection Architecture 
This section proposes autonomic context-dependent architecture for building intrusion 
detection systems that can have a coordinated approach while monitoring the host 
computer as well as the network connected to it. Autonomic computing is capable of 
self-managing and morphing proactively (Abelson, et al., 2000; Tennenhouse, 2001; 
Kephart and Chess, 2003). This feature is particularly beneficial in systems with 
diverse distributed data service requirements on the Internet (Ratnasamy, et al., 2001; 
Cabri, et al., 2002; Qu, et al., 2004). The proposed architecture here leverages 
autonomic agent capabilities and prior malware experiences for efficient intrusion 
detection. A context-dependent agent that is designed to learn on its own and change 
its behaviour based on its previous experience is said to have autonomic computing 
capability as it is able to self-manage and adapt intelligently. This paper presents such 
context-dependent intrusion detection architecture (Figure 7) with autonomic 
capabilities as an initial effort that takes a pre-emptive approach in addressing the 
growing mal ware threats. Context-dependent agents could be designed to possess the 
autonomic elements, namely, self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimising, and self-
protecting capabilities that form the building blocks of autonomic systems (Kephart 
and Chess, 2003; Ganek and Corbi, 2003). These agents continuously monitor the 
intrusion detection requests in collaboration with NIDS and the RIDS through sensors 
and convey resulting actions through effectors. These agents are termed as Network 
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Intrusion Detection Agents (NIDA) and Host Intrusion Detection Agents (HIDA) 
respectively. The data and symptoms received from these agents (from both NIDS and 
HIDS) through the sensors are analysed to plan what action to be taken and to execute 
that action through the effectors. This creates a control loop (as described in the 
theory of autonomic computing) that is coordinated by the Autonomic Detection 
Manager (ADM). 
The ADM implements a particular control loop by using high-level policies to execute 
the most efficient options for carrying out the intrusion detection tasks. It executes the 
control loop by sharing knowledge with the sensors and effectors so as to accomplish 
the four operations, namely, Monitor, Analyze, Plan and Execute of the control loop 
(known as the MAPE loop). An adaptive flow diagram of the MAPE control loop for 
the ADM is given in Figure 8. The intrusion detection sensors (IDS) could be 
composed of several special-purpose context-dependent agents that interact and 
collaborate with each other to formulate their goals. The IDS mainly gathers 
information about the intrusion detection requests and perform analysis based on the 
policies and knowledge-base available in order to arrive at an outcome. For example, 
one of the sensors may act as the virtual machine monitor that inspects the state of 
virtual machine. Information about the possible intrusion is passed on to the Policy 
Engine. This information is matched with the context-dependent policy parameters 
such as: 
distribution method (e.g. E-mail, Instant messaging, etc.), 
activation method (e.g. Registry keys, Init scripts, etc), 
placement method (e.g. Memory, Files, etc.), 
communication method (e.g., open port, sniffer, etc.), 
mode of operation (e.g. DLL injection, System table hooking, etc.), 
payload function used (e.g. Keylogger, File downloads, etc.) and 
self-protection measure utilised (e.g .. Encryption, Polymorphy, etc.) 
Policy Engine 
Knowledge BaselDB 
Rule Sets / Policies 
Policy Parameters 
Symptom Controls 
Resulting Actions 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Sensors 
Intrusion 
Detection 
Effectors 
Figure 8. An Adaptive Flow Diagram ofMAPE Control Loop for Intrusion Detection 
Similarly other context-dependent information based on whether the symptom was 
observed at OS-level or application-level is gathered. Details of audit data, anomalies 
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and specifications collected are used by the Policy Engine to match with the 
knowledge base of prior experiences (Figure 9). The matching process is context-
dependent as the Policy Engine adopts optimal policy rules with the above mentioned 
policy parameters to arrive at possible inferences. In other words, while analysing 
the intrusion detection requests, the Policy Engine compares the information gathered 
as against the knowledge base and policy rule-sets and applies symptom controls to 
determine the analysis outputs as a set of possible intrusions and associated symptom-
sets. 
Dynamic Host Analysis 
Rule Set (e.g. File 
Integrity Check, Process 
Monitor, Disassemby) 
Static Analysis Rule Set 
(e.g. Decompression, 
Disassemby, Virus Scan, 
Strings Research) 
Dynamic Network 
Analysis Rule Set (e.g. 
Network Monitor, Port 
Check, Vulnerability) 
Knowledge Base 
(e.g. Known Virus 
Signatures, APIs, 
Clean States) 
Figure 9. Policy Engine's Expert Inference Framework 
The intrusion detection effectors (IDE) receive the intrusions and symptom-sets from 
the sensors so as to plan and execute the processing ofthe intrusion detection requests 
in an optimal manner. The IDE could consist of several special-purpose context-
dependent agents that collaborate with each other as well as with the sensors. Based 
on the policy rules and symptom-sets forwarded by the Policy Engine, the plan 
element of the effectors selects one of the optimal solutions and the execute element 
carries out the actions for that solution. Before triggering the resulting action, the 
ADM uses the Policy Engine to sense any conflicts for implementing these actions 
that would trace the MAPE loop again until an optimum result is achieved (Figure 8). 
Overall, the 10M controls the events in the loop by having expert rules embedded in it 
as programs for coordinating agent interactions. By the use of knowledge base and 
expert rules pertaining to intrusion detection contexts, it can provide mechanisms for 
dynamically defining (self-configuring), modifying (self-healing and self-optimising), 
and securely (self-protecting) forwarding these rules to the NIDA and the HIDA. An 
intrusion detection request requires highly intelligent, flexible, secure and coordinated 
processing in a networked environment. This is because integration with OS scanner 
policy rules, network scanners and application-level scanners could impact the system 
performance. Several special-purpose detection policies need to be consulted 
simultaneously to arrive at an action plan. The context-dependent agents with an 
autonomic computing architecture have such capabilities of dynamically making use 
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of expert knowledge to collaboratively arrive at the resulting actions in real-time 
(Figure 7). 
Adaptive Expert Rule-based Policy Engine/or Malware Detection 
The expert knowledge-base and rule sets are created based on prior knowledge. Virus 
signature data and policies are available with organisations such as Honeynet Alliance. 
There are well established rule-sets to determine intrusion by analysing runtime 
behaviour. For example, the rule-sets and knowledge base would typically consist of 
existing, well-tested procedures for comparing audit trails of inspecting processes or 
analysing combination of system calls made (Ko, et al., 1994; Lee and Stolfo, 1998). 
Research studies indicate that such efficient process behaviour monitoring results in 
performance degradation of only about 2 percent (Lee, et al., 2003). The agents would 
use existing methods of intercepting and analysing system calls before and after 
performing kernel-level operations using rules from the system call detection engine 
(Sekar, et al., 2002). Sensors monitoring Web connections for scanning worms or for 
preventing cross-site scripting would use well-tested optimised rule-sets (Schechter, et 
al., 2004; Kirda, et al., 2006). Reverse engineering techniques in the knowledge base 
such as examining executables at runtime using block signatures (Milenkovic, et al., 
2005) or static analysis of decompiled assembly code (Bergeron, et al., 2001) would 
cater to detecting known virus signatures. Even the recent malicious boot firmware 
could be detected if it could be verified against a security policy prior to loading it 
into memory. These security policies follow the rules that determine how device 
drivers are allowed to interface with the operating system (Adelstein, et al., 2002). 
Also, agents would adopt cryptographic checksum analysis methods to compare with 
clean boot disk and system utility files (baseline) for detecting any possible rootkit 
intrusion. Such a known system baseline is derived from clean kernel code segments, 
firmware and other system states. 
While the expert rule-based policies described above would output evidence of 
intrusions, they may not be able to provide information about the exact malware 
detected in the case of new obfuscated attacks. With the recent breed of rootkits that 
try to replace the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the system, the rule-based policy gets 
modified to adapt itself as a self-learning process with this new TOotkit experience. 
Such an adaptive expert rule-based policy that makes use of autonomic capabilities 
would then be able to serve for future attacks as well. Figure 10 shows the process 
flow in the development of adaptive expert rule-based policies within the Policy 
Engine of the IDM. 
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Figure 10. Process Flow in Adaptive Expert Policy Engine ofIDM 
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5. Proposed Implementation 
As reported in the Malware case earlier, the recent trends in mal ware are engineered 
for organised crime to achieve huge financial gains. There are more incidents 
reported that link malware to banking Trojans such as Sinowal and the current 
discovery of Mebroot (an MBR rootkit) shows how encrypted configuration 
information about targeted bank Web sites get hooked to the kernel (Symantec, 2008). 
From the decrypted configuration file of Mebroot MBR rootkit, the list of target 
online banking websites is known (Figure 11). Hence, for the development and 
demonstration of the effectiveness of the proposed autonomic intrusion detection 
architecture, an e-business organisation would be considered for implementation and 
testing. 
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Figure 11. Encrypted and Decrypted Configuration File of an MBR Rootkit 
(Source: www.symantec.com/enterprise/security Jesponse/weblog/2008/02) 
The autonomic context-dependent architecture described in the previous section is the 
first step to monitor several attributes of a computer resource or network to 
characterise their state as normal or abnormal and take appropriate action in the IDS. 
The MAPE control loop is capable of incorporating the self-configuring, self-healing, 
self-optimising and self-protecting features that caters to multiple instances of 
malware irrespective of the intrusion mechanism adopted. The autonomic intrusion 
detection system uses an expert knowledge-base related to known malicious activities 
such as form injection, browser help object registration, HTML hijacking, rootkit 
hooking, etc. and even generates new knowledge and rules for unknown malware 
through a self-learning process. However, a typical autonomic architecture poses 
some major implementation challenges (Zambonelli and Mamei, 2002). In order to 
incorporate least technology-intensive manual intervention for initiating an early 
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triage of malware, the following challenges are being addressed for the 
implementation of the autonomic context-dependent intrusion detection architecture. 
1. The implementation system should have the capability of representing and 
storing data, expert knowledge and the rule sets pertaining to virus signatures 
and behaviour patterns in a platform-independent manner that supports 
interoperability and portability. It should possess the power of performing 
dynamic parsing of regular expressions and filtering of policy parameters in 
order to facilitate the symptom matching process 
2. Intrusion detection requires negotiations in the rule-base and policy engine and 
these could pose conflicts. These contlicts need to be addressed automatically 
based on the context and varying parameter values in the policy engine. Hence, 
the implementation modules should support and leverage on context-
dependent agents to follow policies from an adaptive policy engine. 
3. Since a distributed network environment would typically have different 
protection strategies at various layers of the network protocol, adaptive cross-
layer symptom and policy parameter extraction is required. 
4. Suitable optimised strategies are required for any contlict resolution within the 
MAPE control loop since multiple malware instances could lead to different 
priority adoption. 
5. After detecting one or more malware instances, the system should be able to 
adopt the best recovery tools to revert back to original clean state and also lead 
towards self-recovery. 
6. Configuration changes in the distributed environment should be updated by 
dynamically propagating state changes, thereby offering an automated 
deployment and reconfiguration service. Similarly, new malware information 
is used to reconfigure the policy engine as a self-learning process. 
In order to address the above challenges, the implementation of the proposed 
architecture should be aimed at leading to an autonomic context-dependent intrusion 
detection system that could work at a layer below the kernel using virtual network 
technology. Using context-dependent agents that coordinate with each other, the 
adoption of virtual technology would facilitate centralised monitoring of multiple 
instances of maliciousness at various levels: network, file, registry, process, service, 
kernel and firmware. While the main language for implementation would typically 
use low-level socket programming languages such as C++, the knowledge and rule-
base of the policy engine could use high-level programming constructs. The system 
should be flexible to self-configure its monitoring process based on the configuration 
of the distributed network environment. It should also be able to self-protect since 
network stack in the hosted environment would be disabled and the device drivers 
would also be monitored for malicious inputs from virtual devices. The self-adaptive 
Policy Engine would run on isolated virtual machines so that it could self-heal by 
restarting the clean OS in the case of a possible compromise (Dudley, et ai., 2004). 
The context-dependent agents operating at the network (NIDA) and at the host 
(HIDA) would be implemented in a coordinated manner with features such as 
network filters, system filters, registry filters and process filters. Their kernel-mode 
drivers would also have features to maintain the clean states (baseline) of the network 
and the host so that system changes could be identified by the Policy Engine while 
performing the Analysis phase in the MAPE loop. Another important feature would 
be to incorporate memory scanning to extract in-memory strings of terminated 
processes as well as when they are running so as to capture the packed mal ware 
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binaries and code injections. The autonomic intrusion detection system should also 
have a user-friendly interface to report the incidents and the status of the detection 
process for network and system administrators to monitor and to undertake necessary 
steps as recommended by the system. The efficiency of the system could be tested 
under various e-business scenarios using simulated mUltiple mal ware threats. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has put forward the idea of autonomic computing methodology to detect 
malicious activities proactively in a networked system. With the latest obfuscated 
trends of malware that operate stealthily, such a methodology is warranted for an 
automatic, intelligent detection and recovery. Hence, this paper proposes autonomic 
intrusion detection architecture that makes use of context-dependent agents at the 
network-level and host-level to monitor, analyse, plan and execute (MAPE) in a 
collaborative and optimal manner. 
The current sophisticated detection systems may be effective for certain patterns 
exhibited by intrusions but still require a high degree of manual intervention as 
multiple tools are required to be consulted in order to isolate a malicious activity. In 
addition, while these commercial tools may work for some known malware, they may 
not detect new polymorphic malware with multiple instances. The autonomic 
intrusion detection architecture proposed here is capable of addressing such a situation 
as it makes use of an adaptive expert policy engine. A study of malware patterns 
conducted here has resulted in profiling these patterns as syntactic, semantic and 
polymorphic so that their knowledge representations that include virus signatures, 
rule-sets, policies and dynamic symptom parameters could form the fundamental 
block of the policy engine. Together with the context-dependent agents that form the 
sensors and effectors, the policy engine would run on a virtual machine and would be 
able to self-learn and adapt by comparing with the clean states of the host as well as 
the network. Hence, the four tenets of autonomic computing such as, self-
configuring, self-healing, self-optimising and self-protecting that form the core 
features of this autonomic intrusion detection architecture pave the way for future 
intrusion detection systems. 
In this paper, the main implementation challenges of the architecture have been 
identified so as to address them in the development of a feasible autonomic intrusion 
detection system that could be tested and deployed. The next stage of this research 
would focus on demonstrating its ability to detect multiple instances of variant 
malwares within acceptable performance in terms of effectiveness and real-time 
efficiency. 
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